Issues, Ideas and Insights by Atul Singh

America in Afghanistan – Drinking from a Poisoned Chalice

The daily hustle bustle of life is distracting and sometimes makes us forget issues that really matter. Generals, diplomats, congressmen, senators and presidents face even more distractions and are therefore more prone to lose focus. In the uproar about General Stanley McChystal, innumerable issues have been raised but few seem to be asking the bigger question as to why America continues to be in Afghanistan in the first place.

The answer to such a question lies in history which is a good teacher, although its students are usually too busy to pay attention to it. Afghanistan is a land locked country nestled between Iran and Pakistan, with the former Soviet central Asian republics to the north. Despite its rugged and inhospitable terrain, great powers have jostled for it and poured blood and treasure to dominate it for centuries. The intervention has come for reasons as varied as empire building, safeguarding borders and proselytizing. In recent times, the Mughals and the Persians fought many wars over it in the 17th century. The British and Russians were involved in a rivalry that began in the early 19th century and lasted more than a century. This rivalry came to be referred to as “The Great Game” and led the British to fight three Anglo-Afghan wars, the first of which saw nearly 16,000 British troops slaughtered when they marched out of Kabul.

The collapse of the British Empire did not mean the end of rivalry. The Soviets and the Americans engaged in a global struggle for ideological hegemony and fought proxy wars across the world. Once the Soviets invaded Afghanistan in 1979, it became the frontline state in the struggle against communism. In a story now popularized by a Tom Hanks film, “Charlie Wilson’s War”, the Americans got Israelis, Egyptians, Saudis and Pakistanis to work together to fund and train “the mujahedeen”. Once the Soviets pulled out, many of the mujahedeen were transformed into the Taliban and the Americans lost interest in that part of the world. The Taliban was supported by Pakistan’s intelligence agency, the Inter Services Intelligence (ISI), and had close links with Al Qaeda. Therefore, once the Taliban took over Afghanistan, the country became a base from which Osama bin Laden directed the global operations of Al-Qaeda. What happened thereafter is well known. The 9/11 attacks took place and America intervened again and remains involved till today.

Post 9/11, Americans intervened for a clear purpose – destroy Al-Qaeda and dislodge the Taliban. It is important to remember that very few American ground troops were involved in the actual fighting. The bulk of the fighting was done by groups like the Northern Alliance whose leader Ahmad Shah Massoud had just been murdered two days prior to 9/11 by the Taliban. These groups comprised mainly of tribes which had been frozen out of power by the Taliban. Afghanistan is a patchwork of tribes with their rivalries, feuds and conflicts. The Taliban was a Pashtun phenomenon and therefore the Tajiks, Uzbeks, Hazaras and other tribes never really accepted their domination.

Once victory was easily achieved, America did not push home its advantage and lost focus. Aerial strikes weakened the Taliban and Al-Qaeda, causing most of the leadership to move across the border to Pakistan. Here, they have found refuge with the local Pashtuns who are Pakistanis by accident. The British fixed the borders through the Durand Line Agreement with the defeated Afghan government in 1893 splitting the Pashtuns across the border. Pakistani Pashtuns still have close ties with their Afghan kinsmen and provided shelter to fleeing senior leaders of Al-Qaeda including Osama bin Laden. American action weakened Al-Qaeda and impaired its ability to use Afghanistan as a primary base for its operations. However, as Al-Qaeda lost potency America got lulled into complacency and was distracted by Iraq. Soon the Taliban made a comeback, emerging as an insurgent group harassing foreign troops.

America made another mistake which has since come back to haunt it. It assumed that the newly elected Afghan government would keep the Taliban in check and bring the country under control. This did not happen and, as stated above, the Taliban grew in strength, consolidating its control over the Pashtun countryside. At the same time, the Afghan government under Karzai lost credibility because of corruption and ineffectiveness. The election with its large scale irregularities destroyed the little remaining legitimacy of Karzai and the Afghan government. Its writ does not run outside Kabul and it is totally dependent on American military support. It is because of the fear of losing the war to the Taliban that General McChrystal requested more troops. Now there are approximately 30,000 American troops in Afghanistan but success is still elusive.

Is it possible for General Petraeus to turn the tide? The answer in all honesty is no. America’s Afghan adventure is doomed to fail because of three reasons. First, its objectives are far from clear and possibly irreconcilable. Second, it does not have the troops and the stomach for casualties to achieve its vague ambitions. Finally, it does not have enough cash in the bank to keep fighting the Taliban.

Now that the threat from Al-Qaeda has diminished, America is struggling to define its objectives. Presumably, it does not want Al-Qaeda back, it wants the Afghan government to keep the Taliban in check and it wants to start leaving by 2011. These objectives are not entirely aligned and to achieve them, it is stepping up action against the Taliban, trying to create an effective Afghan national army and negotiating with various players to arrive at some kind of a settlement. The catch is that the Taliban now know that the Americans plan to leave. They can and will play the waiting game. All Afghan players now have less of an incentive to come to a settlement and are positioning themselves for a post-American world. Furthermore, the attempt to develop Afghan military forces is quixotically naive. It fails to realize that Afghan loyalties lie to their tribes and clans. The nation, the constitution and the government are artificial constructs which do not mean much to the Afghans. Perhaps if the Americans dug their heels and stayed on for half a century or so, we might witness some sort of a functioning nation state. But the timeframe proposed by the American administration is too short a time to build a state, even for General Petraeus.

America is fighting two wars and its military is stretched. To dominate the Taliban it cannot just control Kabul and Kandahar. Its troops have to walk the villages and valleys in the rugged terrain of Afghanistan. There have to be more boots on the ground – 30,000 troops are not enough. If America is serious about fighting the Taliban, it also has to be willing to accept body bags. However, a key question arises. Will a war weary American electorate accept casualties? Already, the Dutch government has fallen and the German president has resigned over the Afghanistan war. Other allies are pulling troops out and even the British are war weary. Today they decided to pull out of Sangin, the remote district of Helmand. Just as America is increasing the intensity of its operations, its allies are checking out.

Finally, America no longer has financial resources to continue its Afghanistan adventure. $300 billion have already been spent and a 9% deficit is expected in 2010. The economy is overleveraged with the gross federal debt reaching 83.4% of the GDP in 2009 and household debt is still hovering around 100% of the GDP. On top of that neither the government nor households are saving much. In the light of its perilous finances, how much more money can America pour into Afghanistan? Besides, is a war against an elusive insurgent even winnable? Blood and treasure, the two fundamental things needed to fight the Taliban are in short supply.

Muddying the waters further is the fact that the relationship between America and Karzai has broken down. Both need each other but are increasingly at cross-purposes. Foreign players are boosting their participation in the anticipation of the impending power vacuum once American leaves. Pakistan is especially emerging as the power broker in its historic backyard and once again America may have to rely on its unreliable ally. In short, America is out of its depth operating in such treacherous waters. Afghanistan has proved to be a poisoned chalice for great powers many times in its past. It is now America’s turn to drink from this chalice and hope that the poison is not too strong.